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Abstract 
 
Our study can be considered as a brief contribution to the well-disputed questions of the 
so-called inexistence, invalidity, and ineffectiveness of legal transactions in Roman law and in 
its subsequent fate. 
As a theoretical starting point, we emphasize that there are four levels of ability for 
producing legal effects: 1. inexistence (when a legal transaction is not able to produce any 
typical legal effect; 2. invalidity (when a legal transaction exists but it is not able to produce 
the intended legal effects); 3. ineffectiveness (when an existing and valid juridical act could 
produce the intended legal effects, but only potentially and not actually); 4. effectiveness 
(when an existing, valid, and effective legal transaction is actually producing the intended 
legal effects). 
After the Introduction, the problem of inexistence of legal transactions, some questions 
of the invalidity of legal transactions (e.g. terminological questions; elimination of the cause 
of invalidity; partial invalidity), and the problem of the ineffectiveness of legal transactions 
will be analysed. 
Finally, our most important conclusions will be summarized. 
 
Key words: juridical act; inexistence; invalidity; ineffectiveness; punitive character of 
invalidity; terminological inconsistency and the great variety of Roman law sources 
concerning invalidity; nullity and annulment of contracts; convalescentia; conversio; partial 
invalidity; revocation of will. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
a) Our study is a brief contribution to the disputed dogmatic and terminological 
questions of inexistence, invalidity, and ineffectiveness of juridical acts
1
 in Roman law and in 
modern legal systems. 
Inexistence, invalidity, and ineffectiveness of legal transactions, and the dogmatic and 
terminological problems related to these concepts are analysed by many researchers of Roman 
and private law even today. 
In 2014, we published already an autonomous book in Hungarian language regarding 
these questions, too.
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 In this regard the terms “act in law”, “act in the law”, “juristic act”, “legal act”, and “legal transaction” are also 
used in English terminology. See e.g. J. H. MERRYMAN, The civil law tradition, Stanford 1985
2
, 75 ff. Therefore, 
in our study we use these terms as synonyms. 
2
 I. SIKLÓSI, A nemlétező, érvénytelen és hatálytalan jogügyletek elméleti és dogmatikai kérdései a római jogban 
és a modern jogokban [Theoretical and dogmatic questions of the inexistence, invalidity, and ineffectiveness of 
juridical acts in Roman law and in modern legal systems], Budapest 2014. As a kind of summary of the research 
see IDEM, Quelques questions de l’inexistence et l’invalidité des actes juridiques dans le droit romain, in: A. 
Földi / I. Sándor / I. Siklósi (ed.), Ad geographiam historico-iuridicam ope iuris Romani colendam. Studia in 
honorem Gábor Hamza, Budapest 2015, 327—336. 
In this short essay, summarizing several scientific results of our book, only few 
questions can be analysed from the numerous problems of the inexistence, invalidity, and 
ineffectiveness of legal transactions. Following the Introduction, we would like to deal briefly 
with the problems of inexistence of legal transactions (2). Then to some dogmatic and 
terminological questions related to invalidity of contracts will be referred (3)—regarding, 
inter alia, the virtually boundless Roman law and modern private law literature on the 
invalidity of juridical acts, only some important problems can be mentioned. Last but not 
least, we deal with several theoretical, dogmatic, and terminological problems of 
ineffectiveness of juridical acts with special regard to the revocation of will from the point of 
view of legal dogmatics (4). Finally, our most important conclusions will be summarized (5). 
b) According to an ironic observation of Kant, a definition of the concept of law has 
been searched by the jurists for centuries without any success.
3
 This statement can be 
regarded as current not only for the concept of law in general, but for its components, too, 
including inexistence, invalidity, and ineffectiveness of legal transactions as well. 
Regarding the various interpretations of these concepts, our purpose is to clarify and to 
systematize the concepts of inexistence, invalidity, and ineffectiveness of juridical acts. In 
addition, special scientific problems related to these concepts will be mentioned (e.g. the 
raison d’être of the dogmatic construction of contractual inexistence; the applicability of the 
modern concept of the inexistence of contract in Roman law; the formation of the modern 
concepts of nullity and annulment and the applicability of these legal categories in Roman 
law; the problems of elimination of the causes of invalidity in Roman law as well as in its 
subsequent fate; the dogmatic questions of partial invalidity; the theoretical problems of the 
ineffectiveness of juridical acts; the dogmatic problems of the revocation of will). 
c) The reader may conceive that it can be hardly added anything new to the literature. 
Notwithstanding, during research in Roman law, in history of private law, and in modern legal 
systems one can identify uncertain as well as inconsequent dogmatic and terminological 
solutions. Therefore, we would like to try to apply a clear and consequent conceptual system 
and terminology. 
From the point of view of theory, it is unquestionable that consequent application of 
legal concepts is of great importance. The main purpose of our study is to emphasize that 
existence (inexistence), validity (invalidity), and effectiveness (ineffectiveness) are concepts 
based on each other in a logical order. Therefore, we distinguish four levels of ability for 
producing legal effects: 
 
1. Inexistence—when the “legal transaction” is not able to produce any typical legal 
effect; it does not exist in the contractual sphere. 
2. Invalidity—when the legal transaction exists but it is not able to produce the intended 
legal effects. 
3. Ineffectiveness (in strict sense)—when the existing and valid juridical act (without 
any legal fault) could produce the intended legal effects, but only potentially and not actually. 
4. Effectiveness (in strict sense)—when the existing, valid, and “effective” legal 
transaction is actually producing the intended legal effects. 
 
d) As for antecedents of our research, the earlier literature of Roman law often dealt 
with the general theoretical, dogmatic, and terminological questions of invalidity of juridical 
acts (e.g. we can refer to the books and studies of Gradenwitz,
4
 Hellmann,
5
 and Schachian
6
). 
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 I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1787
2, 759: „Noch suchen die Juristen eine Definition zu ihrem Begriffe 
vom Recht”. 
4
 O. GRADENWITZ, Die Ungültigkeit obligatorischer Rechtsgeschäfte, Berlin 1887. 
Apart from these works—which are still significant—the modern authors of Roman law 
usually analyses special scientific questions instead of elaborating the general dogmatic and 
terminological problems of invalidity. In 20
th
 and 21
st
 century many important studies and 
books were published e.g. on the details of contracts in violation of a legal rule (e.g. Kaser
7
), 
of mistake (e.g. Flume,
8
 Zilletti,
9
 Wolf,
10
 Winkel,
11
 and Harke
12
), of simulation (e.g. 
Partsch,
13
 Pugliese,
14
 and Dumont-Kisliakoff
15
), of partial invalidity (e.g. Seiler,
16
 
Zimmermann,
17
 and Staffhorst
18
), of laesio enormis (e.g. Dekkers,
19
 Hackl,
20
 Sirks,
21
 
Pennitz,
22
 Cardilli,
23
 Harke,
24
 Ziliotto,
25
 Westbrook,
26
 Finkenauer,
27
 Platschek,
28
 
Grebieniow;
29
 from the Hungarian literature Visky,
30
 Jusztinger,
31
 and Pókecz Kovács32), of 
conversion (e.g. Giuffrè33 and Krampe34), of convalescence (e.g. Wacke,35 Schanbacher,36 and 
Potjewijd
37
), of dolus (actio de dolo and exceptio doli; e.g. Guarino,
38
 Albanese,
39
 Wacke,
40
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5
 F. HELLMANN, Terminologische Untersuchungen über die rechtliche Unwirksamkeit im römischen Recht, 
München 1914. 
6
 H. SCHACHIAN, Die relative Unwirksamkeit der Rechtsgeschäfte, Berlin 1910. 
7
 M. KASER, Über Verbotsgesetze und verbotswidrige Geschäfte im römischen Recht, Wien 1977. 
8
 W. FLUME, Irrtum und Rechtsgeschäft im römischen Recht, in: Festschrift Fritz Schulz, Weimar 1951. 
9
 U. ZILLETTI, La dottrina dell’errore nella storia del diritto romano, Milano 1961. 
10
 J. G. WOLF, „Error“ im römischen Vertragsrecht, Köln—Graz 1961. 
11
 L. WINKEL, Error iuris nocet, Zutphen 1985. 
12
 J. D. HARKE, Irrtum über wesentliche Eigenschaften, Berlin 2003; IDEM, „Si error aliquis intervenit“ — 
Irrtum im klassischen römischen Vertragsrecht, Berlin 2005. 
13
 J. PARTSCH, Die Lehre vom Scheingeschäfte im römischen Rechte, SZ 42 (1921), 227 ff. 
14
 G. PUGLIESE, La simulazione nei negozi giuridici, Padova 1938. 
15
 N. DUMONT-KISLIAKOFF, La simulation en droit romain, Paris 1970. 
16
 H. H. SEILER, Utile per inutile non vitiatur. Zur Teilunwirksamkeit von Rechtsgeschäften im römischen Recht, 
in: Festschrift für Max Kaser zum 70. Geburtstag, München 1976, 126 ff. 
17
 R. ZIMMERMANN, Richterliches Modifikationsrecht oder Totalnichtigkeit? Berlin 1979. 
18
 A. STAFFHORST, Die Teilnichtigkeit von Rechtsgeschäften im klassischen römischen Recht, Berlin 2006. 
19
 R. DEKKERS, La lésion énorme, Paris 1937. 
20
 K. HACKL, Zu den Wurzeln der Anfechtung wegen „laesio enormis“, SZ 98 (1981), 147 ff. 
21
 B. SIRKS, La « laesio enormis » en droit romain et byzantin, TR 53 (1985), 291 ff.; IDEM, Laesio enormis 
again, RIDA 54 (2007), 461 ff. 
22
 M. PENNITZ, Zur Anfechtung wegen „laesio enormis“ im römischen Recht, in: Iurisprudentia universalis. 
Festschrift für Theo Mayer-Maly, Köln—Weimar—Wien 2002, 575 ff. 
23
 R. CARDILLI, Alcune osservazioni su leges epiclassiche e interpretatio: a margine di Impp. Diocl. et Maxim. 
C. 4, 44, 2 e C. 4, 44, 8, in: Molnár Imre Emlékkönyv [Studies in honour of Imre Molnár], Szeged 2004, 115 ff. 
24
 J. D. HARKE, Laesio enormis als „error in negotio“, SZ 122 (2005), 91 ff. 
25
 P. ZILIOTTO, La misura della sinallagmaticità: buona fede e ‘laesio enormis’, in: L. Garofalo (cur.), La 
compravendita e l’interdipendenza delle obbligazioni nel diritto romano, 1, Padova 2007, 597 ff. 
26
 R. WESTBROOK, The origin of laesio enormis, RIDA 55 (2008), 39 ff. 
27
 TH. FINKENAUER, Zur Renaissance der „laesio enormis“ beim Kaufvertrag, in: Festschrift Hans Peter 
Westermann, Köln 2008, 183 ff. 
28
 J. PLATSCHEK, Bemerkungen zur Datierung der „laesio enormis“, SZ 128 (2011), 406 ff. 
29
 A. GREBIENIOW, La ‘laesio enormis’ e la stabilità contrattuale, RIDA 61 (2014), 195 ff. 
30
 K. VISKY, Appunti sulla origine della lesione enorme, Iura 12 (1961), 40 ff.; IDEM, Spuren der 
Wirtschaftskrise der Kaiserzeit in den römischen Rechtsquellen, Budapest—Bonn 1983, 24 ff. 
31
 E.g. J. JUSZTINGER, The principle of laesio enormis in sale and purchase contracts in Roman law, in: Studia 
iuridica auctoritate universitatis Pécs publicata 149 (2011), 107 ff. 
32
 A. PÓKECZ KOVÁCS, Laesio enormis and its survival in modern civil codes, in: E. Štenpien (ed.), Kúpna 
zmluva — história a súčasnost’ II, Košice 2014, 219 ff. 
33
 V. GIUFFRÈ, L’utilizzazione degli atti giuridici mediante ‘conversione’ in diritto romano, Napoli 1965. 
34
 CHR. KRAMPE, Die Konversion des Rechtsgeschäfts, Frankfurt am Main 1980. 
35
 A. WACKE, Die Konvaleszenz der Verfügung eines Nichtberechtigten, SZ 114 (1997), 197 ff. 
36
 D. SCHANBACHER, Die Konvaleszenz von Pfandrechten im klassischen römischen Recht, Berlin 1987. 
37
 G. H. POTJEWIJD, Beschikkingsbevoegdheid, bekrachtiging en convalescentie. Een romanistische studie, 
Deventer 1998. 
38
 A. GUARINO, La sussidiarietà dell’ ‘actio de dolo’, Labeo 8 (1962), 270 ff. 
Burdese,
41
 and Meruzzi
42
), and of actio quod metus causa (e.g. Kupisch
43
 and Calore
44
) 
Naturally, in the famous and important monographs and handbooks treating general questions 
of juridical acts (see for instance the works of Scialoja,
45
 Álvarez Suárez,46 Albanese,47 and 
Flume
48
), invalidity and ineffectiveness of juridical acts were discussed, too. 
However, from the modern Italian literature of Roman law—which often distinguishes 
between invalidity and ineffectiveness in a strict sense—we can refer e.g to the monograph of 
Di Paola (published in 1966
49
) treating the problems of invalidity (invalidità) and 
ineffectiveness (inefficacia) of juridical acts in Roman law. A lengthy study of Talamanca 
(published in 2005
50
) deserves a special mention, too; here, the Italian scholar investigates the 
inexistence (inesistenza), invalidity (invalidità), and ineffectiveness (inefficacia) of juridical 
acts in context of Roman law. 
As for Hungarian (Roman law as well as private law) literature, the most specialised 
analysis of invalidity of contracts can be found in the great monograph of Emilia Weiss, 
published in 1969,
51
 which did not lose much from its scientific significance. Since 1998, 
András Földi has been deeply analysing the theoretical problems of validity and effectiveness 
of juridical acts on the basis of provisions of the (old) Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 but with 
also regard to Roman law, legal history, and comparative private law. Földi’s studies52 
induced a scientific debate in the Hungarian literature (e.g. see the studies of András 
Bessenyő53 and Iván Siklósi54). In 2000, a monograph on invalidity due to the faults of 
contractual will
55
 and, in 2004, another excellent treatise on contracts against good morals
56
 
was published by Attila Menyhárd who also scrutinized these questions in a comparative 
manner. In the year of 2008, a monograph treating the problems of invalidity of contract in 
Hungarian private law was published by Gábor Kiss and István Sándor (2nd edition: 2014).57 
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The problems of contracts in contradiction to good morals were analysed in legal historical 
and comparative context by Gergely Deli in several studies
58
 and an excellent book (published 
in 2013).
59
 
e) Since this short essay has been written on the basis of our above-mentioned book on 
inexistence, invalidity, and ineffectiveness of legal transactions in Roman law and in its 
subsequent fate, here are some words on the methods of our research. 
Our quite complex choice of topic—with special regard to the Roman law research—
needed the application of a complex scientific method which is dogmatic on the one hand and 
historical on the other. Although the dogmatic method has enjoyed priority, a kind of 
“mixed” methodology of dogmatic and historical approach was applied. 
During our Roman law research we often applied modern concepts in order to describe 
and to analyse the Roman law institutions. Since the main concepts investigated in our book 
were created to a considerable extent in the Pandectist legal science, some important works 
from the German jurisprudence of 19
th
 century have been taken into account (e.g. the books of 
Savigny,
60
 Puchta,
61
 Dernburg,
62
 and Windscheid
63
). 
Prominent handbooks as well as important and often cited textbooks of Roman law 
were also reflected. 
In addition to the studies and monographs in which the problems of inexistence, 
invalidity, and ineffectiveness of juridical acts were exclusively dealt with, we made use of 
the above-mentioned great German, Italian, and Spanish monographs treating the general 
problems of juridical acts. 
Considering the sources of Roman law, legal history, and modern legal systems as well, 
we always attempted to go back to the original, primary sources. As for the interpretation of 
Roman law sources, we usually did not search for interpolations, regarding the mainstream 
scientific approach of modern Roman law researchers according to which the textual critic 
(“Textkritik”) can only be regarded as the last instrument during the interpretation of a given 
text.
64
 
The definition of existence (inexistence) of juridical acts, the axiological approach of 
invalidity, and the analysis of the relation of existence (inexistence), validity (invalidity), and 
effectiveness (ineffectiveness) deserved a legal theoretical and legal philosophical approach. 
Since the above-mentioned dogmatic constructions in some modern legal systems were 
also within the scope of our research, we also applied a comparative legal approach. 
Roman law solutions were always scrutinized in the first place, the modern legal 
constructions were analysed later on the basis of the Roman law tradition. In this respect we 
have to refer to the method of Zimmermann, elaborated in his famous book entitled “The law 
of obligations”. His work considerably inspired the approach as well as the method of our 
research.
65
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65
 However, we could not forget about the importance of ancient Greek laws, for they had influence on certain 
categories of Roman law. Furthermore, results of the legal papyrology concerning the contractual practice of 
Rome are also to be taken into consideration. The tradition of ius commune has also a great importance, 
especially the canon law which serves as a basis of many modern legal principles and categories (e.g. the 
Hereafter, we would like to briefly summarize the essence of our scientific results. 
 
2. Inexistence of legal transactions 
 
a) As for the problems of inexistence of contract in Roman law and in modern legal 
systems, we have to emphasize that the raison d’être of the category of inexistence of contract 
and its applicability in Roman law were and still are heavily disputed both in Roman law and 
private law literature. In this respect a kind of ontological approach would have to be needed. 
We can cite the famous question of Heidegger: “Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht 
vielmehr nichts?”66 
b) As a starting point of the research of the construction of “inexistence” in Roman 
law—following the theory of Mitteis67—serves the famous text of Gaius (3, 176)68 which can 
be described as a good example of the Roman law roots of the distinction between inexistence 
and invalidity of legal transactions. On the basis of the casuistic Roman law sources (see Ulp. 
D. 12, 1, 18 pr.; Ulp. D. 12, 1, 18, 1; Ven. D. 45, 1, 137 pr.; Iul. D. 41, 1, 36; Ulp. D. 2, 14, 1, 
3; Iav. D. 44, 7, 55; Ulp. D. 18, 1, 2, 1; Pomp. D. 18, 1, 8 pr.; Paul. D. 18, 4, 7; Gai. 3, 140; 
Gai. 3, 142; Pap. D. 24, 1, 52 pr.; Inst. 3, 24 pr.; Paul. D. 44, 7, 3, 2) we can find the roots of 
the modern category of inexistence of contract in Roman law. However, the modern concept 
of inexistence of contracts and the modern distinction of inexistence and invalidity of juridical 
acts are not applicable without restrictions to Roman law sources. In the sources the terms are 
often irrelevant (see for instance Paul. D. 17, 1, 22, 3; Pap. D. 13, 7, 40 pr.; Iav. D. 41, 3, 21; 
C. 4, 38, 2; Ulp. D. 24, 1, 32, 24; Ulp. D. 41, 3, 27). 
c) It is worth mentioning that—contrary to invalidity—the inexistence of contract is not 
to be regarded as an unlawful situation. The “inexistence” of a contract in the contractual 
sphere means inexistence regarding the lack of the so-called “äußerer Tatbestand”. This 
consideration can help us to distinguish between inexistence and invalidity of juridical acts in 
the modern legal systems, too. 
 
3. Invalidity of legal transactions 
 
a) Considering the dogmatic and terminological questions related to invalidity of 
contracts, first of all, the dogmatic nature of invalidity—which always has a punitive 
character (contrary to the inexistence and ineffectiveness)—has to be analysed. 
According to Windscheid, an invalid legal act is a body without soul and it does not 
exist in the sphere of law.69 On the basis of a famous phrase of Anatole France (“l’Âme est la 
substance; le corps l’apparence”) we can emphasize that an existing but invalid juridical act 
has a body but—without having a soul—it is not able to produce any intended legal effect, 
even potentially. Contrary to the invalid juridical act, the valid legal transaction can be 
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. 
regarded as a mens sana in corpora sano; an existing and valid juridical act is able to 
produce potentially the intended legal effects. 
It is well-known that the abstract term of invalidity, inter alia, had not been composed 
by Roman jurists. With Zimmermann’s words, “the Roman lawyers were unconcerned about 
dogmatic niceties”.70 This remark is especially relevant concerning invalidity since there are 
more than hundred different expressions describing inexistence, invalidity, and ineffectiveness 
of juridical acts in Roman law sources. See e.g. the terms nullum esse, nullum (or non) fieri, 
nullum stare, nullius momenti esse, non (or nec) valere, nullam vim (or nullas vires) habere, 
effectum non habere, inefficax esse, ad effectum perduci non posse, sine effectu esse, pro non 
facto haberi (or pro non facta est), pro non scripto haberi, non videri factum, non intellegi, 
nec facere potest, non esse, non consistere, non subsistere, neque (or nisi) constat, non 
contrahi (obligationem), non videtur contrahi, contrahi non potest, nihil agere, inutilis, utile 
non esse, irritus, imperfectus, ratum non (or nullo tempore) haberi (or ratum non est), inanis 
(or inane factum), vitiosum esse, vitiari, frustra facere, non posse (or non potest fieri etc.), 
non licere, illicitus, non permitti, non (or nihil) est permissum, prohiberi, impedire (or 
impediri), obstare, corrumpere, infirmare (or infirmari), infirmum, non nocere, non prodesse 
(or non [nihil] proficere), non sequi (or nec sequenda est), non teneri, non tenere, iuris 
vinculum non optinet (obtinet), non obligari (or non est obligatorium, non [nec] nascitur 
obligatio, and nulla obligatio nascitur), non (or nullo modo) deberi (or debere), non 
acquirere, actio non datur (or actio denegatur, actio non competit, actio peti non posse), 
compelli non posse (or cogendum non esse, ne cogatur), ius (or facultatem, potestatem) non 
habere (faciendi), recte (or iure) non fieri (or facere), or non iure factum, iustum non haberi 
(or iniustum), coiri non posse, evanescere, nihil esse, nihil posse, nihil momenti habere, 
submoveri, supervacuum, pro infecto haberi, pro non adiecto haberi, invalidus, vanum, 
impedimentum adferre, perimi, remitti, tolli, rescindere, and rumpere (cf. e.g. the results of 
research of Mitteis,71 Hellmann,72 Di Paola,73 and Staffhorst74). Bringing these expressions 
into a logic order turned out to be hopeless but important scholars (from the modern Roman 
law literature e.g. Marrone75 and Földi76) find signs of a consequent terminology in case of a 
few expressions (see for instance infirmari, pro non scripto haberi, irritum fieri, rumpitur, 
and rescindere). 
The terminological inconsistency and the great variety of Roman law sources 
concerning invalidity deeply affected the modern legal terminology in this respect.77 
b) As for “nullity” and “annulment” of contracts in Roman law, the applicability of 
modern concept of annulment to Roman law sources is disputed even in the modern literature 
of Roman law. On the basis of casuistic sources and vast literature we can lay down that the 
Roman law roots of the concept concerning annulment can mainly be found in the legal 
constructions related to the “annulment” according to ius civile (see e.g. the rescission of 
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 As for the terminology of invalidity in modern legal systems, in our book we distinguished between a 
“German-type” and a “French-type” terminology. The characteristic terminology of the French Code civil of 
1804 concerning invalidity had an essential impact e.g. on the terminology of Spanish Código civil of 1889 and 
of Civil Code of Québec of 1994 concerning invalidity. The terminology of Italian Codice civile of 1942 and the 
Portuguese Código civil of 1966 concerning invalidity is based, however, both on the German and French legal 
tradition. 
testamentum inofficiosum, the rescission of sale in case of laesio enormis, and the exceptio 
based on senatus consultum Vellaeanum). 
Regarding the distinction of nullity and annulment, it is generally accepted and 
emphasized in the literature that the modern concept of annulment (Anfechtbarkeit in German 
legal terminology) and the distinction of nullity and annulment had been created by Savigny78 
in the 19th century and that the distinction of nullity and annulment within the context of the 
invalidity was used for the first time by German scholars of the Pandectist legal science. In 
this regard, however, we also have to take into consideration the achievements of the earlier 
jurisprudence. Scrutinizing the Dutch and French antecedents of the distinction of nullity and 
annulment before the 19th century, we would like to emphasize the significance of the œuvre 
of Vinnius,79 Domat,80 and Pothier.81 With special regard to Domat’s “Les loix civiles dans 
leur ordre naturel” the distinction of nullity and annulment seems to be known in the French 
jurisprudence even at the end of 17th century. Therefore, the traditional view, according to 
which the distinction of nullity and annulment was first elaborated in the German Pandectist 
legal science, needs to be revised. 
c) As for elimination of the cause of invalidity, the legal constructions of convalescence 
and conversion of juridical acts have to be mentioned. Since invalidity can be normally 
regarded as a “final verdict on the fate of a transaction” (Zimmermann),82 the elimination of 
cause of invalidity is always exceptional in Roman law (cf. the so-called regula Catoniana in 
Roman law
83
) and in modern legal systems. Contrary to convalescentia, which means 
convalescence of an originally invalid transaction in the same form (see e.g. Ulp. D. 44, 4, 4, 
32; Ulp. D. 6, 1, 72; Pomp. D. 21, 3, 2; Paul. D. 13, 7, 41; Mod. D. 20, 1, 22), conversio could 
be considered as a transformation of an invalid juridical act into another valid one (see the 
definition of Harpprecht, published in 1747: “traductio vel commutatio unius negotii in 
alterum”84). The applicability of modern concept of conversion elaborated according to subtle 
dogmatic distinctions is much disputed in the Roman law literature (see for instance Giuffrè85 
from the Italian and Krampe
86
 from the German bibliography, concerning the problem of 
dogmatic nature of conversion). After due consideration of the most important sources (cf. 
Gai. 2, 197; Ulp. 24, 11a; Paul. D. 17, 1, 1, 4; Ulp. D. 29, 1, 3; Ulp. D. 29, 1, 19 pr.), we think 
that the modern concept of conversion may be—with certain restrictions—equally applicable 
in Roman law. 
d) Although—according to Scialoja—the distinction of total and partial invalidity is 
very simple, the reason for existence of partial invalidity is highly contested both in Roman 
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law and private law literature (see for instance the above-cited works of Seiler and 
Zimmermann; recently see the excellent monograph of Staffhorst). In the light of the most 
relevant Roman law sources, partial invalidity of contracts was already known by the 
classical Roman jurists, who often applied the legal instrument of fiction in this regard (cf. 
Paul. D. 18, 1, 57 pr.; Marci. D. 18, 1, 44; Gai. 3, 103; Paul. D. 13, 6, 17 pr.; Ulp. D. 24, 1, 5, 
5; Pomp. D. 24, 1, 31, 3; Pap. D. 24, 1, 52 pr.; Ulp. D. 45, 1, 1, 5; Ulp. D. 45, 1, 1, 4; Pomp. 
D. 45, 1, 109). However, partial invalidity was only expressly formulated by the scholars of 
ius commune (see Accursius, gl. Per hanc inutilem, ad. D. 45, 1, 1, 5; Liber Sextus 
decretalium D. Bonifacii Papae VIII., De regulis iuris, regula XXXVII). As for the raison 
d’être of partial invalidity: in our opinion, partial invalidity of a juridical act can only be 
recognized when the contractual will and, therefore, the juridical act itself can be divided into 
different autonomous parts and, additionally, when it is backed by the interests of the parties. 
 
4. Ineffectiveness of legal transactions 
 
a) As for ineffectiveness of juridical acts, we would like to focus on the revocation of 
will from the point of view of the legal dogmatics (from the Hungarian literature see the 
above-cited essays of Földi and Bessenyő). 
First of all, however, some words on the various interpretations of the notion 
“ineffectiveness”. 
In our interpretation, validity is merely a theoretical possibility of producing legal 
effects. Effectiveness means, however, the actual production of the intended legal effects. The 
relation of invalidity and ineffectiveness can be described through various theoretical models. 
Nevertheless, a strict interpretation of ineffectiveness seems to be useful according to which 
only valid juridical acts are regarded as effective or ineffective. In this sense, ineffectiveness 
only means the state of a valid juridical act when it cannot produce the intended legal effects 
actually. 
However, modern German lawyers generally use the word “Unwirksamkeit” in the 
sense of invalidity, without differentiating between invalidity and ineffectiveness of juridical 
acts.
87
 There is a similar situation for instance in the French jurisprudence which does not 
distinguish dogmatically and terminologically between invalidity (“invalidité”) and 
ineffectiveness (“inefficacité”) in strict sense.88 However, in Italian (using the term of 
“inefficacia in senso stretto”89), Spanish (using the term of “ineficacia en sentido estricto”90), 
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inexistence as a third form of the ineffectiveness of a legal transaction („troisième forme d’inefficacité de l’acte 
juridique”). 
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and Hungarian
91
 literature, the strict distinction of invalidity and ineffectiveness is well-
known. 
b) As for the legal aspects of revocation of will, our point of departure is that a will 
cannot induce the required legal consequences before the testator’s death (vivente testatore), 
only thereafter (mortuo testatore), although the will can produce certain legal effects before 
the testator’s death (e.g. the revocability of the will itself) too. However, these cannot be 
regarded as intended legal effects. 
Related to the provisions of the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 (650. § [1]) and the new 
Hungarian Civil Code of 2013 (7:41. § [1]), the revocation of will results in its subsequent 
ineffectiveness. This terminologically problematic provision served as starting point for the 
investigation of András Földi who strongly criticized the legal provisions of the Civil Code of 
1959, proposing the application of the retroactive invalidity in this context. 
In our opinion, however, the dogmatic category of retroactive invalidity of juridical acts 
is untenable. The undisputable fact that a testator’s intentions are changeable right to the end 
of his or her life cannot justify the retroactive nullity of a revoked will. If that were the case, 
the parties could annul their contract by mutual agreement with a retroactive effect (e.g. the 
Roman novatio, the French novation, or the Italian novazione do not cause the retroactive 
invalidity but the termination of the contract). It is unacceptable to consider a Roman law 
source (Ulp. D. 34, 4, 4: „ambulatoria enim est voluntas defuncti usque ad vitae supremum 
exitum”) as an evidence for the theoretical justification of retroactive invalidity in modern 
legal systems. Revocation is an act for which the category of retroactive invalidity cannot be 
used because invalidity always has a punitive character. To put it briefly, invalidity is always 
a sanction. As for the revocation of a will, it seems appropriate to introduce a third category: 
the fall of the will.
92
 It expresses the idea that a revoked will is incapable of inducing legal 
effects. (In Roman law the terminology for it is rumpitur, cf. Inst. 2, 17 pr.
93
) 
We cannot share Bessenyő’s opinion, that the problem can be solved by differentiating 
between “institutional” and “normative” theories. We would recommend instead the 
determination of an appropriate frame of reference and its consistent adherence. The various 
meanings and levels of effectiveness need to be kept apart, and the relationship between 
validity and effectiveness has to be clarified. 
c) From the point of view of a practical lawyer, however, it does not make a substantial 
difference which approach (the subsequent ineffectiveness, the retroactive invalidity, or the 
fall of the will) is accepted. The essence of all above-mentioned theories is, of course, that the 
heir is not able to acquire the “inheritance” before the testator’s death. However, legal theory 
delivers further arguments in favour of a consequent, logic, and clear terminology not only 
because it has a great importance in legal science but also because of its indirect or direct 
influence on law in action. 
 
5. Conclusions 
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 „Testamentum iure factum usque eo valet donec rumpatur irritumve fiat.” 
a) As a starting point, we distinguished four levels of ability for producing legal effects: 
1) inexistence of a legal transaction (when it is not able to produce any typical legal effect); 
2) invalidity of a legal transaction (when it exists but it is not able to produce the intended 
legal effects; 3) ineffectiveness (in strict sense) of a legal transaction (when the juridical act 
without any legal fault could produce potentially the intended legal effects); and finally 4) 
effectiveness (in strict sense) of a legal transaction (when the valid legal transaction is 
actually producing the intended legal effects). 
b) At the first level, the “juridical act” is not able to produce any “typical” legal effects. 
At the fourth level, however, the existing, valid, and effective juridical act is able to produce 
potentially as well as actually and in fact is producing the “typical” and intended legal effects. 
Naturally, it is a simplified model and the reality is much more difficult. At the second level, 
for instance, the juridical act can be partial or relatively invalid, and at the third and fourth 
level ineffectiveness or effectiveness can have different intensities. 
c) It has been pointed out that a consequent application of legal concepts is of great 
importance from the point of view of theory. Apart from the theoretical importance one may 
ask whether the results of this system could be applied in law-making or in legal practice. 
Here are some examples in this respect. 
This conceptual system serves not only for educational purposes but it can have 
significance in legal practice and in law-making, too. For instance, in case of inexistence the 
consequences of invalidity cannot be applied; an in integrum restitutio is not possible; the 
fault cannot be eliminated since there is no juridical act and, therefore, convalescence or 
conversion is not possible because no legal transaction exists. In case of inexistence, the rules 
of extra-contractual liability for damages or the norms of unjustified enrichment are 
applicable. 
As for the discussions concerning the dogmatic nature of the revocation of will, we have 
to stress the point that (on the basis of the critic of the Hungarian legal experiences) 
ineffectiveness must have the same sense in law of contracts and in law of succession as well. 
This opinion might be considered in law-making, too. 
As for the factors violating the validity of the contracts, we have to note that the 
traditional division of the causes of invalidity into faults of contractual will, of declaration, 
and of intended legal effect can be regarded as schematic. Therefore, the importance of this 
model is not to be overestimated. In regard to a famous text of Paul (D. 18, 1, 57 pr.
94
)—
which is in the context of partial invalidity relevant—we can lay down that the invalidity of 
the sale of a house which has been partially burnt can be based either on mistake (as a fault of 
contractual will) or on impossibility (as a fault of intended legal effect). There can be different 
argumentations and approaches in this case, but the result will be the same: invalidity. As for 
the dogmatic nature of emptio mixta cum donatione in context of Ulp. D. 24, 1, 5, 5,
95
 the 
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invalidity of the legal transaction might be explained by simulation (as a fault of contractual 
will) or by an evasion of a legal rule (as a fault of intended legal effect) since the purpose of 
simulation is always to evade a legal rule. 
Both in Roman law and private law literature it is usual and generally accepted to 
distinguish between physical and legal impossibility. In our opinion, however, the application 
of the dogmatic category of legal impossibility has no raison d’être since a legally impossible 
contract is always against the law that is always illegal.
96
 
Regarding the reasons for the existence of the partial invalidity the interest of the 
parties is to be mentioned rather than abstract dogmatic considerations. It means the 
application of the so-called “principle of interest” (see the German term “Utilitätsprinzip”) 
which is known and applied in the sphere of contractual liability.
97
 
d) The above-mentioned examples clearly show that dogmatic analysis and dogmatism 
do not mean the same. Jurisprudence has to serve, first and foremost, the legislative process 
and the legal practice.
98
 This general statement is also valid for our research concerning the 
inexistence, the invalidity, and the ineffectiveness of juridical acts. 
e) Finally, we hope that the system of concepts of existence (inexistence), validity 
(invalidity), and effectiveness (ineffectiveness) of legal transactions can be useful for lawyers 
working both in theory and practice, and not only for private lawyers but also for the experts 
of other legal branches (e.g. constitutional law, administrative law, law of civil procedure). 
Since the contract itself can be regarded as a “special norm”, inexistence, invalidity, and 
ineffectiveness of a “special” norm and of a “general” one can be examined in a similar 
manner. On the basis of this consideration we can speak about, for instance, “non-existing”, 
invalid, ineffective act, judgement, and administrative decision. Placing this assumption in a 
wider context, the importance of the traditional distinction of private and public law
99—which 
is fundamental for lawyers in civil law jurisdictions but unimportant for common lawyers—
can also be revised. 
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